I first used an electronic voting machine in 2006. I inserted my magnetic voter card and entered my votes on the touch screen, one time accidentally selecting the wrong candidate and backing up to change that vote. When I finished voting, I verified all my votes on the touchscreen. After that, the machine printed all my votes on a piece of paper for me to verify. When I was done, I returned my voter card and the paper tally to the proper boxes. I had created 2 separate records of my vote: one electronic, one paper. Piece of cake.
Electronic voting machines that produce a paper trail are a tremendous leap forward in vote security because these machines provide redundant vote counts. The electronic tally should always be compared against the paper trail tally and any discrepancies rectified to determine the final vote count. In order to corrupt these redundant vote counts, a crook must corrupt both the electronic tally and the paper tally, which is significantly more difficult than corrupting just one count, be it electronic or paper.
Redundant machines provide a significant improvement in vote security over either paper ballots or an electronic counts alone. But because of a study showing that these machines can be hacked, Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner has dictated that every county using voting machines also supply paper ballots in the March primaries, even though paper ballots can’t stop a hacker. She is also asking the legislature to outlaw voting machines before the 2008 presidential election.
It shouldn’t surprise anybody that voting machines can be hacked. Any computer can be hacked. Corrupt officials can corrupt voting machine counts just like they can corrupt paper ballot counts. That’s why officials develop procedures and penalties to make corrupting vote counts difficult and expensive. Electronic machines with a redundant paper trail are inherently more secure, and refining procedures to monitor the machines, electronic keys, and their printed results will make it virtually impossible to corrupt vote counts.
Mrs. Brunner did extensive work in election law in the age of paper ballots, so this great leap backward puts her in her comfort zone and appeases Democrats who either don’t want vote security or don’t want to move forward. Moving backward in security and technology instead of moving forward and improving technology, procedures, and security for the future undermines voter confidence and disenfranchises voters.
